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We study optimal pricing of roads and public transport in presence of nonlinear in-
come taxation. Individuals are heterogeneous in unobservable earning ability. Optimal
transport tariffs depend on time costs of travel and work schedule adjustments (days
and hours worked per day) as a response to commuting costs. We find that discounts for
low income individuals are optimal only if the time cost of a trip is small enough. Lower
travel time costs facilitate screening: therefore, redistribution provides an additional
motive for congestion pricing. Finally, we investigate the desirability of means-testing
of transport tariffs.
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1 Introduction
It is often argued that prices on urban transport networks should reflect social costs of travel.
For instance, as roads suffer from congestion externalities, economic theory suggests that road
pricing can increase efficiency. Clearly, this may also have an impact on the distribution of
welfare across society. Indeed, policymakers often care about redistribution when designing
tariffs for publicly provided transport infrastructure. Concerns of a possible regressive effect
recently impeded the introduction of road pricing in New York City and Paris.1 Plans
for a road pricing scheme in San Francisco include a tariff discount to low income drivers,
while discounted public transport fares are often granted to people qualifying for certain
criteria, including income. Moreover, governments often subsidize commuting expenditures
(e.g. through tax exemptions) for reasons that include helping disadvantaged workers.
Economic literature has looked at redistributive issues in pricing of transportation infras-
tructure (see Small and Verhoef (2007) for a comprehensive review). However, it has done
so (with an important exception discussed below) ignoring the presence of income taxation.
This leaves open the question of whether such concerns are actually relevant, as they could
possibly be addressed with appropriately designed income taxes. The main objective of this
paper is to study such a question.
We consider the problem of a welfare-maximizing government that designs both income
taxes and tariffs for roads and public transportation.2 Individuals are heterogeneous in (ex-
ogenous) earning ability, which is assumed to be private information, as is their labor supply.
Thus, the government faces self-selection constraints that may limit welfare redistribution.
To keep the setup as simple as possible, we use a model with only two types of individuals
(à la Stiglitz (1982)).
It is well-established that nonlinear tariffs are a crucial ingredient of efficient pricing
policies in network industries (Wilson (1993)). They are drawing increasing interest also
in transportation, although their potential redistributive role (recognized in other regulated
industries, e.g. energy or telecommunications) has not been explored.3 This is why they
are studied in the current paper. Nonetheless, nonlinear pricing may not always be imple-
1In a recent interview, New York State Assemblyman Richard L. Brodsky said he opposed its introduction
for the reason that these schemes put the burden for paying the fees on blue blood and blue collar alike
(see New York Times, Congestion Pricing: Just Another Regressive Tax? www.nytimes.com)
2The term "tariff" should be given a broad interpretation here: since the government controls taxes and
prices, tariffs we describe may result not only from fares or tolls, but also from commuting subsidies in the
form of tax deductions.
3see Wang et al. (2011) for a study of nonlinear pricing of tolled roads and Batarce and Ivaldi (2011)
for public transportation. Cremer and Gahvari (2002) study nonlinear pricing by a regulated firm in the
presence of optimal income taxation. Their setup, however, neglects important features for transportation,
such as time costs of consumption.
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mentable (at least at reasonable costs).4 This is why we also look at the case in which the
government is constrained to use linear tariffs.
Previous public finance literature has studied how (if at all) a government that can use
income taxes should deviate, due to distributional concerns, from correcting market failures
(Cremer et al. (1998), Bovenberg and Goulder (2002), Kaplow (2006)). However, it has
disregarded two relevant features for transportation, which are central in our analysis. The
first is that consumption of transport goods requires travel time. Boadway and Gahvari
(2006) and Gahvari (2007) consider time of consumption in an optimal redistributive taxation
framework. They do not consider externalities.5 Mayeres and Proost (1997) study optimal
redistributive taxation in the presence of congestion externalities, but restrict attention to
linear taxes. Our approach is complementary, since it does not assume restrictions on the
design of income taxes (it is constrained only by the available information).
A second key feature of our setup is that we explicitly model the relation between travel
and labor supply. Individuals can decide the number of days at the workplace (which re-
quire commuting) and the length of their working day (or their daily effort). This can be
interpreted as the choice between jobs offering different time schedules. For instance, one
may choose a job with a four-days-a-week schedule or a five-days-a-week one but requir-
ing shorter daily shifts. Intuitively, increased commuting costs encourage, all else equal, to
choose the former.6 However, we assume substituting working days for more hours worked
per day implies a penalty in terms of productivity. This is due to diminishing returns in daily
hours caused, for example, by fatigue. 7 While labor supply plays a central role in models
of income taxation, little attention has been dedicated to the impact of policies that affect
commuting to work. Parry and Bento (2001) and Van Dender (2003) consider the issue,
although in a setup with homogeneous individuals. Moreover, their model of labor supply is
more rigid, allowing only the choice of working days (of fixed length). This matters because
4It is indeed quite demanding in informational terms, since observability of individual trip quantities is
necessary. This information is not rarely available though: for example, most road pricing schemes involve
the use of electronic tolling systems that keep track of individual accesses to the tolled road. Moreover,
governments often have access to commuting data collected by employers. We discuss feasibility issues at
the end of Section 2 below
5Cremer et al. (1998) and Kaplow (2006) studied environmental levies in the presence of nonlinear income
taxation. They consider a model where commodities do not require any time for consumption. Moreover,
they focus on externalities that do not affect the marginal cost of consuming goods, unlike traffic congestion.
An optimal taxation model with time as input for activities and congestion externalities is also studied in
De Borger (2011). He uses a representative agent framework.
6Commuters may also have other margins of flexibility in responding to changes in travel costs: they may
change their residence or shift travel to off-peak hours (Arnott et al. (1993)). A discussion of their likely
impact on our results is provided in the concluding remarks.
7This can also be interpreted as capturing the trade-off between workdays at the office and telework, as
long as working outside the office (e.g., at home) is less productive than working on-the-job This is discussed
in some detail in Section 3 below.
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if individuals can adjust daily hours, increasing the cost of commuting does not necessarily
result in lower labor supply. This has important implications for optimal transport tariffs.8
We show, to begin, that transport pricing has a redistributive role even in the presence
of nonlinear income taxation. It can be used to improve screening of types, relaxing the
self selection constraints.9 In our setup, individuals face a trade-off when deciding on their
work schedule. On the one hand, commuting less often saves time spent on travel. On
the other, it requires (at constant income) to increase workday length and, hence, total
hours worked. This is because when people work more hours per day, (average) hourly
productivity is reduced. Our findings suggest, roughly speaking, that if this reduction is
large (resp. small) compared to the time cost of a trip on a given mode, it is optimal to
have low ability individuals pay a smaller (resp. larger) tariff to use that mode. The reason
is that low ability types have less free time than high ability mimickers. Hence, encouraging
low types to commute more often (via a lower tariff) improves their welfare more than that
of mimickers only if the benefit in terms of reduced labor supply outweighs the additional
time spent on travel. It is only in that case that lowering the tariff intended for low ability
types relaxes self-selection constraints. To put it differently, our results suggest that, for a
given transport mode, discounted tariffs for low income individuals are optimal if and only
if the time cost of travel on that mode is small enough. If travel by public transport is
more time-consuming than car travel, this suggests that "social" tariffs and discounts for
low income households may be more effective, in redistributive terms, when concerning cars
than public transportation.
The above implies that individuals of different earning ability should not pay the same
tariff for a given transport mode. Hence, nonlinear tariffs are necessary to implement the
second-best allocation (constrained, that is, only by self-selection). However, as mentioned
above, the government may also face additional information constraints: it may only be
able to observe aggregate trip quantities (anonymous transactions). In that case, only linear
tariffs are implementable. Even so, the trade-off described above is a key determinant of
optimal prices. In essence, the optimal (linear) tariff for a given mode tends to increase with
travel time cost, but decreases with the extent of productivity losses when commuting is
discouraged and more daily hours induced.
Furthermore, different value of time for individuals of different ability (at a given quan-
8It is quite intuitive that the costs of commuting have an impact on labor supply. However, there exists
some empirical evidence (Gutierrez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2010)) suggesting this impact is small.
Since further research is needed to corroborate or qualify these results, the assumptions on which our analysis
is based look reasonable.
9This is true in spite of the fact that individuals' preferences are separable in goods and leisure. In the
absence of time costs of travel and of diminishing returns in daily hours, separability would make distributive
concerns irrelevant when designing pricing of transport infrastructure (Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976)).
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tity of goods and income) implies that screening of types can be sharpened by reducing the
time costs of journeys. Hence, curbing road congestion may also make redistribution more
effective. This gives an additional motive to raise car tariffs for all types. Interestingly, a
redistribution-minded government has, therefore, an additional reason to implement conges-
tion pricing. This is in line with the results of Kreiner and Verdelin (2012), who focus on
provision of public goods.
As the anecdotal evidence mentioned above shows, there are concerns that transport
tariffs that closely follow marginal social costs of travel may be hurtful to the poor. The
government may thus want to differentiate them based on income, introducing means-testing.
The suitability of means-testing for urban transportation is part of the current policy debate
(see, e.g. Estupinan et al. (2007)). The results we obtained suggest that, when nonlinear
tariffs can be implemented, individuals of different income should not pay the same per-trip
tariff.10 However, this does not necessarily imply that individuals differing in income should
be offered different tariff schedules (i.e., that transport tariffs should be means-tested). In
the last part of the paper, we turn our attention to such a question. We show that when
modal split, in the second-best allocation, is such that high income individuals commute
more by car than low income ones and public transport trips have larger time costs than car
trips, transport tariffs can be independent of income. That is, under a reasonable condition,
individuals of different income can be offered the same tariff schedules and means-testing
avoided. We conduct some numerical simulations in the final section of the paper. We
find only very few counterexamples in which implementability with separable tax and tariff
functions cannot be achieved.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. We present
optimal tariffs in Section 3. Section 4 considers implementation and means-testing. Section
5 presents some numerical illustrations of the results. Section 6 concludes. Proofs of all
propositions are provided in an Appendix.
10The results described above are obtained under the assumption that the government uses a general
tax-and-pricing function, based on income and trip quantities. This means that optimal transport tariffs
should, a priori, be conditional on income. Income taxes may also have to be conditional on travel quantities.
Note also that if the government is constrained to use linear tariffs, it is because individual trip quantities
are unobservable and all transactions are anonymous. In that case, tariff differentiation is never incentive-
compatible.
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2 The model
2.1 Setup
We consider a population composed of two types of individuals i = 1, 2. They differ in
earning ability (a measure of their productivity at work), identified by the parameter wi,
with w2 > w1. The size of group i is denoted pii, with
∑
i=1,2 pii = 1.
There are five goods in the economy: composite consumption C (the numeraire), (peak-
hour) trips by car D and public transportation B, leisure x and labor supply L. The
production technology is linear in labor, with constant marginal costs normalized to one,
for C and D. The production sector is perfectly competitive. The marginal cost of a public
transport trip, sustained by the government (assumed to be the provider of the service), is
constant and equal to cB.
A trip by car or public transport requires aj j = D,B units of time, for all individuals.
11
We ignore heterogeneity in location: hence, all trips cover the same distance. We assume the
time spent consuming C to be a (perfect) substitute for leisure. Thus, contrary to time on
travel and at work, it has no opportunity cost (see Boadway and Gahvari (2006)). Individuals
face the time constraint
aDD
i + aBB
i + Li + xi ≤ 1 i = 1, 2
Suffix i stands for individual quantities, which may vary depending on the individual's type.
We normalize the time endowment to one (same for all types). To capture road congestion,
we assume that aD is an increasing and convex function of the aggregate amount of car trips.
Congestion on public transport is ignored for simplicity: it would make the optimal tariff
formulae more complicated without adding much to the results. Therefore aD = ϕ
D(D¯)
and aB is fixed, with D¯ =
∑
i=1,2 piiD
i denoting the total level of road traffic. We assume
also that aD is taken as given when deciding how many car trips to take, which generates a
congestion externality.
Individuals choose the amount of labor supply deciding on two key parameters: N ,
the number of working days, and h, the amount of hours worked per day on-the-job. Labor
supply is thus L = N ·h. This represents the choice between jobs offering different workdays-
hours schedules. For example, the individual may have the choice between a job offering a
four-days-a-week schedule but requiring longer daily shifts (e.g. start early or finish late) or
one with a five-days-a-week schedule but with shorter daily shifts. Moreover, h may also be
11Transport trips can be seen as activities obtained combining goods and time. We assume a fixed-
proportions household production technology, as in, e.g., Kleven (2004), so our formulation is consistent
with that representation.
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interpreted as a measure of effort provided (for a given number of hours) per day on the job.
All individuals are assumed to be commuters and to use the transport network only for this
purpose (which we consider a reasonable simplification given our focus on peak-hour travel,
for which commuting is a dominant contributor). A day at the workplace requires a return
commuting trip, on one of the two modes. Therefore: N i = Di + Bi. Finally, individuals'
income is obtained as
I i = N iwif(hi) =
(
Di +Bi
)
wif(hi) i = 1, 2
where, importantly f ′ > 0, f ′′ < 0. The assumption of decreasing returns in hours per day
captures diminishing productivity when working longer hours or when increasing daily effort
(as in Gutierrez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2010)). This may be because of fatigue,
but also because opportunities to interact and coordinate with colleagues or customers may
be smaller when working at early or late hours. The more these effects constrain hourly
productivity, the greater the concavity of function f . For a given individual of type wi, total
labor supply (which is unobservable) can be rewritten as
Li = N i · hi = (Di +Bi)g
(
I i
wi (Di +Bi)
)
where hi = g
(
I i
wi (Di +Bi)
)
using the fact that N i = Di+Bi and that f(hi) = Ii/wi(Di+Bi). Function g(.) is the inverse of
f(.). Therefore g′ > 0, g′′ > 0. As may already be understood, diminishing returns generate
an important trade-off when deciding on the work and travel schedule. If an individual travels
one more day to work, she has to sustain the monetary and time costs of a commuting trip.
On the other hand, doing so allows, for given income, to reduce total labor supply. This is
because hours per day are reduced and average hourly productivity goes up. We will see
below that such a trade-off has important implications for the optimal tariff schemes.
All individuals have the same utility function
U(C,D,B, x) = Ω(C) + γ(D,B) + φ(x)
Note the separability between leisure and goods. In the absence of time costs of travel and of
diminishing returns on hours worked per day, this would yield the Atkinson-Stiglitz (1976)
result of redundancy of marginal tariffs (except for pigouvian ones). However, in our model
this result does not hold. We assume Ω (.) and φ (.) to be increasing and concave. As for
γ (.), it may be increasing or decreasing in D and B. Transport trips, though necessary
for commuting, may provide some utility to the individual (which could be interpreted as
an additional purpose of the trip, such as escorting kids to school, i.e. trip chaining), or
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disutility (e.g. stress). In this we follow Parry and Bento (2001) and Van Dender (2003).
The objective of the government is to maximize the social welfare function
W =
∑
i=1,2
δiU i
where δi are positive weights, with the normalization
∑
i=1,2 δ
i = 1. We impose no a pri-
ori restriction on the instruments it may use, except from the information at its disposal.
Assuming individual's income to be observable, the government has access to a nonlinear
income tax schedule. As for transport trips, we are going to study two alternative scenarios.
In the first, for each type i = 1, 2, individual trip quantities Di and Bi can be observed by
the government, This is crucial for implementability of nonlinear transport tariffs. While
obstacles to the use of nonlinear tariffs exist, in reality road and public transport pricing
schemes are not rarely nonlinear, at least to some extent. From a technological standpoint
at least, observability of individual trip quantities seems feasible.12 Moreover, in many coun-
tries information on commuting travel is collected directly by employers (and passed on to
governments) to be used ex-post as the basis to compute commuting subsidies (in the form of
discounts on transport tariffs or tax deductions and rebates). Indeed, the pricing schedules
we discuss below can be interpreted as resulting also from those subsidies. Nonetheless, we
also consider a second scenario, in which only aggregate trip quantities are observable and
transactions are anonymous. In that case, only linear tariffs are feasible.
3 Optimal transport tariffs
3.1 Nonlinear transport tariffs
3.1.1 Government's maximization problem
When, on top of income I, individual consumption of D and B can be observed, the design
of nonlinear transport tariffs is essentially akin to that of nonlinear commodity (as well as
income) taxes.13 We begin by rewriting the utility function of a given type in terms of
12Urban road pricing schemes usually involve the use of electronic systems allowing to track each car's
access to the tolled road. As for public transportation, many cities have adopted the use of smart cards (e.g.
the Oyster Card in London or the Passe Navigo in Paris) which require personal registration and allow to
keep track of trips taken.
13As for C, with observable income, if transport trips are observable then individual's consumption level
is observable as well.
8
observable quantities. We also saturate the time constraint and replace for x, so
U i = Ω(Ci) + γ
(
Di, Bi
)
+ φ
(
1− aDDi − aBBi − (Di +Bi)g
(
I i
wi(Di +Bi)
))
i = 1, 2
U i is type-specific since, for a given allocation, it depends on wi. We proceed as if the
government directly chose allocations, for each type of individual, of C,D,B and I. This
follows the Taxation Principle (Stiglitz (1982)). The government's problem is
max{Ci,Di,Bi,Ii} W
subject to the budget constraint∑
i=1,2
pii
(
I i − Ci −Di − cBBi
) ≥ R (1)
(where R is an exogenous revenue requirement) and, assuming only one self selection con-
straint is relevant (this is a reasonable assumption in a two-type setup like ours)
U2 ≥ U21 (2)
where
U21 = Ω(C1) + γ
(
D1, B1
)
+ φ
(
1− aDD1 − aBB1 − (D1 +B1)g
(
I1
w2(D1 +B1)
))
is the utility of a high ability type mimicking a low ability one. Constraint (2) tells us that
the optimal allocations designed by the government have to be such that individuals of high
earning ability do not chose the bundle (of income, travel quantities and consumption)
intended for low ability ones. Note that when mimicking, an high ability type will need to
work less while earning the same income and consuming the same amount of C,D and B as
the type she mimics. In this framework, mimickers commute to work the same number of
days as the mimicked, but provide less hours of work per day (or daily effort).
To implement the optimal allocation, the government sets nonlinear tariffs for the trans-
port network (i.e. road and public transport pricing schedules) as well as nonlinear income
taxes. More precisely, the government designs a general general tax function Θ(C,D,B, I)
based on all observable quantities. In what follows, (as is customary in the literature) we
will focus on marginal (i.e. per-trip) tariffs tiD,t
i
B (the marginal tax on income tI is presented
in the Appendix).14 We assume, without loss of generality, that good C is untaxed. The
14This is a slight abuse of notation, since they are part of nonlinear schedules, which, a priori, depend on
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Lagrangian of the government's problem is
L =W + µ
(∑
i=1,2
pii(I
i − Ci −Di − cBBi)−R
)
+ λ
(
U2 − U21)
The first order conditions of this problem are provided in the Appendix.
It is useful to illustrate the adjustment in labor supply induced by a marginal change in
the number of workdays (i.e. commuting trips). For a given type, the latter writes as
mi =
∂Li
∂N i
= −g′
(
I i
wi(Di +Bi)
)
·
(
I i
wi(Di +Bi)
)
+ g
(
I i
wi(Di +Bi)
)
i = 1, 2
Note that mi < 0 due to convexity of g(.). Given that hours per day at the workplace have
diminishing returns, marginally increasing the number of commuting days (i.e. trips) brings
the individual, for a given income, to reduce total labor supply. This is an interesting feature
of our model, that comes from the fact that we allow the choice not only of working days,
but also of daily labor supply. We have also
m21 = −g′
(
I1
w2(D1 +B1)
)
·
(
I1
w2(D1 +B1)
)
+ g
(
I1
w2(D1 +B1)
)
as the adjustment for the individual of type 2 mimicking an individual of type 1. It is easy
to see that m1 < m21 < 0, as w
2 > w1. Given their smaller daily effort, mimickers can
substitute hours worked for days at the workplace suffering smaller productivity losses than
low skilled types. This has relevant implications for optimal tariffs.
3.1.2 Benchmark
As a benchmark, consider the ideal case in which the government observes w, L, or both.
Then λ = 0. The optimal per-trip tariffs are
t1D = t
2
D = τD ≡
∂ϕD
∂D¯
∑
i=1,2
pii
(
Di
φix
ΩiC
)
tiB = cB i = 1, 2
Let us begin from tariffs for car trips tD: they should consist simply of a Pigouvian tax. Their
only component is τD, the marginal external cost of a trip. This is given by the increase
all quantities observed. For instance
tiD ≡
∂Θ(Ci, Di, Bi, Ii)
∂Di
The general tax function may also include lump-sum tax/transfers, as well as fixed components of transport
tariffs (e.g. the fixed part of a two part tariff).
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in time of journeys (on aggregate) due to additional congestion on the road, weighted by
the individuals' the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption φ
i
x
ΩiC
, for
i = 1, 2. Such ratio provides a measure of the individual's valuation of time.15 Tariffs for
public transportation tB should be equal to the marginal cost of providing the trip, cB. Thus,
in the presence of optimal income taxation, and if self selection constraints are not relevant,
optimal tariff schedules should not deviate from the marginal social cost of a trip. This is
because the government can use differentiated lump sum taxes to redistribute welfare and
cover the eventual fixed costs of service provision.
3.1.3 Optimal marginal tariffs with binding self-selection constraints
Consider now the case in which w and L are unobservable and the self selection constraint
binds, so λ > 0. The following holds.
PROPOSITION 1: When nonlinear transport tariffs are feasible, the optimal per-trip
tariffs for cars and public transport tij i = 1, 2 j = D,B are
t1D = τD + ηD + zD t
2
D = τD + ηD t
1
B = cB + zB t
2
B = cB
where
ηD =
λ
µ
∂ϕD
∂D¯
(
D1Ω21C
(
φ1x
Ω1C
− φ
21
x
Ω21C
))
zj =
λ
µ
Ω21C
pi1
(
aj
(
φ1x
Ω1C
− φ
21
x
Ω21C
)
+
(
m1
φ1x
Ω1C
−m21 φ
21
x
Ω21C
))
j = D,B
For both cars and public transport, marginal tariff formulae are different than in the
benchmark case. They contain additional incentive terms, whose role is to improve screen-
ing of types (in spite of leisure-goods separability in preferences). Their presence depends
on travel being time consuming and (partially) complementary to labor supply, due to di-
minishing returns in daily hours.
Let us focus first on tD. While the marginal tariff (e.g. a road toll) t
2
D intended for high
skilled individuals contains only two terms (on which we comment below), the tariff intended
for individuals of low ability t1D carries the additional incentive component zD. As is quite
customary in these models, there is an additional distortion to low types' use of cars that
the government optimally introduces in order to improve screening of types. this is obtained
15There is a large literature on the value of time in transportation (Jara-Diaz (2008)). Generally, it
corresponds to the wage rate corrected for the additional utility (or disutility) of time spent on travel, in
monetary terms. In our model, a unit of time at work and on travel have the same opportunity cost in terms
of foregone leisure.
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by raising (or lowering, depending on the sign of zD) the marginal tariff they face. It is
interesting to look at what determines its direction. This depends on the trade-off between
daily productivity (at given income) and commuting time that we introduced above. To
illustrate, assume zD = 0, so all individuals pay the same (marginal) road toll. Suppose now
the government decided to raise the toll intended for low ability types, thereby increasing
their commuting costs. By commuting less, low types (and high types who wanted to mimic
them) would save time otherwise spent on travel. This is captured by the first term in
parenthesis in zD: the time cost of a trip by car aD, multiplied by difference of marginal
valuation of time for low ability type and high ability mimicker. For a mimicker time is less
valuable, at the margin, than for a low ability individual (all else given, the mimicker needs
to work less and has more free time). Indeed, φ
1
x
Ω1C
− φ21x
Ω21C
> 0. As a consequence, the toll
increase would hurt the low type less than the mimicker, if there was no change in labor
supply. However, commuting less often (i.e. adopting a work schedule with less workdays,
but of greater length, at given income) increases total labor supply. This is particularly
true for low skilled types: their daily effort is larger than the mimicker's. Hence, they stand
to lose more, in productivity terms, by having to further increase daily hours (recall that
m1 < m21 < 0). The sign of zD depends on which of these two effects has the greater
magnitude. If the increase in labor supply is higher (resp. lower) than the time cost of the
trip itself, the tariff raise hurts low ability types more (less) than high ability mimickers.
As a consequence, the self-selection constraint would be tightened (resp. relaxed). Loosely
speaking, suppose (all else given) an additional workday lets the individual reduce total labor
supply and the commuting trip by car is not too lengthy. Then, it is optimal to have low skill
individuals pay a smaller marginal tariff for car trips than high skill types (and vice-versa).16
The formulae for tD also contain two non-type specific terms. The first is the τD pigou-
vian term described above. The second is ηD: this is strictly positive and accounts for how
a reduction in road congestion can foster screening of types. The reason is that a marginal
reduction in aD is always going to benefit low ability individuals more than high ability mim-
ickers, whose time is less valuable for them at the margin. Unlike in the benchmark case,
the marginal external cost of a trip is not only the classic pigouvian one but has to include
the extra cost of congestion in making redistribution less effective. The incentive effect of
public goods (or bads, as in this case), in the presence of nonlinear income taxation, has
been previously analyzed by Boadway and Keen (1993), Pirttilä and Tuomala (1997) and,
16It is not easy to say, a priori, which of the two effects above is of greater relevance. To fix ideas, consider
two extreme cases. Suppose, first, that the time cost of a car trip were negligible, so aD → 0. Then, we would
have zD < 0. Suppose, instead, that daily hours had constant returns, so that the length of the working day
does not affect productivity (g′′ = 0). As long as the time cost of a car trip is non-negligible, so aD > 0 , we
would have zD > 0.
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more recently, Kreiner and Verdelin (2012). However, in the setup of the first two papers,
this effect does not survive if individuals have separable preferences for goods and leisure,
which we assume. Kreiner and Verdelin pointed out that such an effect exists as long as
there is positive correlation between an individual's ability and her willingness to pay for a
public good, at a given income and consumption bundle. This is indeed the case here since
individuals have to allocate time to labor, leisure and travel. By relaxing the time constraint
at the individual level, reductions in road congestion benefit more mimicked than mimickers.
This is interesting from a policy perspective because it means that redistribution provides
an additional motive to raise tariffs (for all types), in order to curb network congestion.17
It is also interesting to note that the optimal marginal tariff for high ability types is
strictly higher than a standard pigouvian tax. Note, also, that ηD is larger the more low
ability types commute by car, D1.18
Finally, we can look at public transport tariffs tB: marginal tariffs for low ability types
t1B also carry the component zB, whose nature is similar to zD discussed above. Except, of
course, that the relevant time cost of a trip is aB. It is however interesting to note that
the formulae for zj only differ in the per trip time cost aj. Hence, the extent to which the
government wants, for redistributive reasons, to encourage low income individuals to use of
a given mode (by lowering the marginal tariff they face) is generally larger the smaller the
time cost of travel on that mode. Hence, if travel by car is less costly in time terms than by
public transport (assuming the distance to be traveled is invariant), it is more desirable to
discount tariffs for cars than for public transport.
3.2 Optimal linear transport tariffs
Let us now consider the case in which individual trip quantities are not observable and all
transactions are anonymous. Then, the government has to design a mixed tax system with
nonlinear income taxes and linear tariffs for transportation.
17A similar effect would be observed if we allowed the government also to control investment in infrastruc-
ture: as long as greater network capacity allows, all else given, to reduce travel times, its provision can also
produce a positive redistributive effect.
18Previous analyses of transport pricing with redistributive concerns (see, e.g., Mayeres and Proost (1997))
have suggested that (linear) tariffs on a given mode should be higher when the mode is used to a large extent
by high income individuals. In our model, this does not apply. High income (and ability) types pay, with
respect to the pigouvian tax, a premium which is higher the more low income types use cars. Moreover,
it is not necessarily the case that high ability/income types should be charged more, for a trip, than low
ability/income ones.
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3.2.1 Government's maximization problem
We proceed, following Cremer et al. (1998), under the assumption that the government de-
signs an optimal revelation mechanism consisting of a set of type-specific before-tax incomes
I i, disposable incomes yi (expenditures on consumption and travel) and a vector of transport
tariffs t = (tD, tB), which are akin to commodity taxes. Equivalently, the mechanism designs
trip prices q = (qD, qB) where qD = 1 + tD and qB = tB. Again, without loss of generality,
we assume C is untaxed. The mechanism assigns the bundle (q, yi, I i) to an individual that
reports type i = 1, 2. The couple (yi, I i) is such that I i − T (I i) = yi, where T (I) is the in-
come tax schedule. Given prices and disposable income, the individual decides consumption
and travel quantities. That is, given (q, yi, I i), a type-i individual solves
maxC,D,B U
i (C,D,B, y, I) i = 1, 2
(note that the utility function U i (C,D,B, y, I) is type specific because, at a given allocation,
it depends on wi) subject to the budget constraint
C + qDD + qBB = y
We denote the resulting conditional demand functions as
Di = Di
(
q, yi, I i
)
Bi = Bi
(
q, yi, I i
)
Ci = Ci
(
q, yi, I i
)
again, demands are type specific (given q, yi, I i) since utility depend on wi. We denote the
(type-specific) indirect utility function as V i (q, yi, I i) = U i (Di, Bi, Ci, yi, I i). Finally, we
define
D21 = D2
(
q, y1, I1
)
B21 = B2
(
q, y1, I1
)
C21 = C
(
q, y1, I1
)
V 21
(
q, y1, I1
)
= U2
(
D21, B21, C21, y1, I1
)
as demands and indirect utility function for a mimicker. Once again, given the presence of
only two types in our setup, we can safely focus only on cases in which high ability types
want to mimick low ability ones. The government's problem is19
maxq,yi,Ii,D¯
∑
i=1,2
δiV i
19It is convenient to solve this problem assuming that the government also decides on the amount of road
congestion D¯.
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subject to the budget constraint∑
i=1,2
pii
(
I i − yi + tDDi + (tB − cB)Bi
) ≥ R (3)
and the self-selection constraint
V 2 ≥ V 21 (4)
we still denote by µ and λ the Lagrange multipliers for these constraints. The solution to
this problem is presented in the Appendix.
3.2.2 Benchmark
With no self-selection constraints binding, so λ = 0, optimal tariffs are tD =
∂ϕD
∂D¯
∑
i=1,2 pii
φixD
i
∂V i/∂yi
and tB = cB. As in the previous section, they have no redistributive role.
20
3.2.3 Optimal transport tariffs with binding self-selection constraints
Consider now the case in which w and L are unobservable and the self selection constraint
binds, so λ > 0. The following holds.
PROPOSITION 2: When the government is constrained to use linear transport tariffs,
the optimal tariffs tj j = D,B satisfy the following(
tD − ε
tB − cB
)
= A−1 ·
(
λ
µ
∂V 21
∂y1
(D1 −D21)
λ
µ
∂V 21
∂y1
(B1 −B21)
)
where
A =
 ∑i=1,2 pii ∂D˜i∂qDχ ∑i=1,2 pii ( ∂B˜i∂qD + ∂B˜i∂aD · ∂ϕD∂D · ∂D˜i∂qDχ)∑
i=1,2 pii
∂D˜i
∂qB
χ
∑
i=1,2 pii
(
∂B˜i
∂qB
+ ∂B˜
i
∂aD
· ∂ϕD
∂D
· ∂D˜i
∂qB
χ
) 
ε =
∂ϕD
∂D¯
(∑
i=1,2
pii
φixD
i
∂V i/∂yi
+
λ
µ
∂V 21
∂y1
(
φ1xD
1
∂V 1/∂y1
− φ
21
x D
21
∂V 21/∂y1
))
χ =
1
1− ∂ϕD
∂D¯
∑
i=1,2 pii
∂D˜i
∂aD
< 1
where D˜i and B˜i denote hicksian demands for, respectively, car and public transport
travel. χ is a feedback term that stands for the net effect of a change in prices on the
demand for car trips, after accounting for the change in road congestion.
20We here write the value of time as
φix
∂V i/∂yi
i = 1, 2 since this form is more convenient for solving
the problem below. With no binding self-selection constraints and nonlinear income taxation, one has
∂V i/∂yi = µ = ΩiC i = 1, 2. So the benchmark value of tD is the same as that of Section 3.1.
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The structure of optimal tariffs is affected by two incentive terms. Their presence is not
novel. First, a reduction in road congestion affects the self-selection constraint in a similar
way as in the case of nonlinear tariffs (compare the second component of ε above and term
ηD in Proposition 1). It is not possible to precisely determine what direction the effect takes
here. This is because, when tariffs are linear, mimicker and mimicked do not necessarily
commute the same number of times to the workplace (even if they face the same budget
constraint). Nonetheless, except if the mimicker drives much more than the mimicked, it is
reasonable to expect the sign of this term to be positive. The second incentive term (right
hand side of the equalities in the proposition) is positive if and only if mimickers use more
the given mode (car or public transport) than mimicked. Again, this cannot be immediately
determined. To get some more insight, we will now present a simplified example with a single
travel mode. It will show that the signs of the incentive terms just described may depend
crucially on the trade-off between time cost of commuting trips and labor supply changes
when days at the workplace are substituted with more hours per day.
A single mode example Consider the case in which cars are the only travel mode (we
could focus on public transport with similar outcomes). Then the optimal tariff is simply
tD = ε+
1∑
i=1,2 pii
∂D˜i
∂qD
χ
(
λ
µ
∂V 21
∂y1
(
D1 −D21)) =⇒ D21 T D1 ⇔ tD T ε
In such a simplified setup, the budget constraint of mimicker and mimicked is the same. The
only difference between them, at a given (D0, C0) couple, is the I/w ratio (and, given this,
the number of daily work hours). Thus, whether a mimicker drives more than a mimicked
depends simply on whether her indifference curves in the (D,C) plane are flatter than those
of a mimicked. That is
D21 T D1 ⇔ σ (D,C; I1/w2) T σ (D,C; I1/w1)
at a given allocation. The slope of an indifference curve, computed at a given allocation
(D0, C0), is
σ (D0, C0; I/w) = −
∂U/∂D
∂U/∂C
= −γD (D0) + φx · (−aD −m)
ΩC (D0)
where
m = g
(
I
wD0
)
− g′
(
I
wD0
)
·
(
I
wD0
)
< 0
16
taking the derivative of σ with respect to I/w, one obtains
∂σ
∂ (I/w)
= −
φxx · g′
(
I
wD0
)
· (−aD −m)− φx · g′′
(
I
wD0
)
·
(
I
wD20
)
ΩC
The sign depends on the trade-off between days at the workplace and commuting trips that
drives the difference between marginal tariffs when nonlinear pricing is feasible (see term zj
in Proposition 1). Indeed, when the time cost of a commuting trip is larger (resp. smaller)
than the reduction in labor supply with more day on-the-job, then ∂σ
∂(I/w)
< 0 (resp. > 0).
Therefore, D21 < D1 (resp. >D1).
Since the sign of ∂σ
∂(I/w)
is not immediately determined, it is once again useful to look at
two extreme cases. Suppose that the time cost of a trip were negligible, so aD → 0 while
f
′′
< 0 (and g
′′
> 0) . In that case, ∂σ
∂(I/w)
> 0 so σ (D,C; I1/w2) < σ (D,C; I1/w1). Then,
tD < ε. Moreover, if a low ability type drives more than a mimicker, the incentive term in
ε is will certainly be positive. Suppose, instead, that hours worked per day had constant
returns, so f
′′
= g′′ = 0, and the time cost of a car trip were non-negligible, aD > 0 . In that
case, m would be equal to zero, so σ (D,C; I1/w2) > σ (D,C; I1/w1) and tD > ε.
3.3 Telework
The model presented above can easily be adapted to consider telework (i.e. work done outside
the standard workplace, e.g. at home), with little impact on the results. It is generally
recognized that telework has the potential to ease the pressure on transport networks in
peak hours, by reducing travel demand. However, it may also lead to lower productivity
than work done while physically on the job, as coordination with colleagues and supervisors
(or supervisees) is more difficult. Also, monitoring of work safety and data protection is
more complicated.
If indeed there is a productivity penality for telework, one more day at the workplace, for
given income, reduces total labor supply. However, it requires a time-consuming commuting
trip. Whether commuting should thus be more or less encouraged than for high ability ones
depends on a trade-off that is essentially the same as in the case of choice of workday lenght.21
This is why, in terms of optimal pricing schedules (in the presence of optimal income taxes),
the results would not differ from those derived above.
Let us sketch how the model could be adapted to include telework. Denote by s the
number of days worked outside the workplace. In order to neatly identify the trade-off
21De Borger and Wuyts (2011) study a model with telework, though without looking at distributional
concerns.
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between working off and at the workplace, we assume a fixed lenght for working days and
normalize such lenght to unity. An amount N of days at the workplace provides wiN i = 1, 2
units of income. Each requires a commuting trip. An amount s of days off the workplace
brings instead wif(s) i = 1, 2 units of income, where f is an increasing and concave function,
with f(0) = 0, f ′(0) ≤ 1. Therefore, I i = wi (N i + f(si)). Concavity of f captures increasing
losses in productivity as more days of telework replace days at the workplace. With such a
setup, we have si = g
(
I
wi
−Ni
)
with g being the inverse of f , thus increasing and convex.
Then mi = 1− g′
(
Ii
wi
−Ni
)
, so m1 < m21 < 0.
4 Implementation of optimal tax and tariff schedules
The question we investigate now is whether means-testing is a useful tool for a redistribution-
minded government designing both transport tariffs and income taxes. This responds to some
questions raised in the policy debate on reforming transport pricing (see the Introduction).
If only linear tariffs are feasible and all transactions anonymous, the question is moot. This
is why we focus on the case in which the government can use nonlinear tariff schedules.
In Section 3.1, we have assumed that the government implements the second-best alloca-
tion (defined as ASB) using a generalized tax-and-tariff function Θ(C,D,B, I). This means
that, a priori, it may have to design tariff schedules for transportation that are differentiated
according to income. Moreover, the income tax schedule may have to depend on commut-
ing trips. Following Cremer and Gahvari (2002), we are now going to study whether using
an income tax function T (I) and a separate transport tariff schedule P (D,B) is enough
to implement ASB.22 If such a thing is feasible, then transport tariffs do not need to be
means-tested.
The government looks to implement the second-best allocation
ASB =
(
(C1, D1, B1, I1); (C2, D2, B2, I2)
)
that solves the problem presented in Section 3.1, using the functions T (I) and P (D,B). T i
and P i i = 1, 2 denote respectively the payments of income taxes and transport tariffs for
individuals of type 1 and 2. Therefore Ci = I i − (T i + P i) i = 1, 2. Incentive compatibility
of the tax and tariff schedules calls for types 1 and 2 to choose quantities and payments
22The setup of our problem is similar to that of Cremer and Gahvari. Our results are different. The
reason is that, even with separable preferences, consumption of transport trips affects the marginal utility
of leisure. This makes implementation with separable functions more difficult to achieve, as labor supply
(and income) and consumption decisions cannot be separated. In addition, we do not assume any difference
in tastes between individuals of different ability. Finally, our problem is of greater complexity due to the
presence of two goods that the government has to price.
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((T (I1)); (P (D1 +B1))) and ((T (I2)); (P (D2 +B2)) respectively. The increased complex-
ity stems from the fact that individuals have additional possibilities to deviate from the
bundle designed for them. For instance, they may choose to consume a quantity of trips
D + B intended for the other type, while choosing the amount of I intended for them. Or
they could choose to mimick the other's type income, while consuming the right amount of
D+B. Therefore, in order to be implementable through separable payment functions, ASB
has to respect the standard incentive compatibility constraint (2), the government's budget
constraint (??), plus four additional incentive constraints ensuring domination of partial
mimicking strategies (each of them for i = 1, 2 i˜ 6= i):
Ω(I i − T i − P i) + γ(Di, Bi) + φ(1− aDDi − aBBi −
(
Di +Bi
)
g
(
I i
wi (Di +Bi)
)
) ≥
Ω(I i˜ − T i˜ − P i) + γ(Di, Bi) + φ(1− aDDi − aBBi −
(
Di +Bi
)
g
(
I i˜
wi (Di +Bi)
)
) (5)
Ω(I i − T i − P i) + γ(Di, Bi) + φ(1− aDDi − aBBi −
(
Di +Bi
)
g
(
I i
wi (Di +Bi)
)
) ≥
Ω(I i − T i − P i˜) + γ(Di˜, B i˜) + φ(1− aDDi˜ − aBB i˜ −
(
Dj +Bj
)
g
(
I i
wi
(
Di˜ +B i˜
))) (6)
The first two ensure that an individual of type i will not, while choosing the number of
transport trips intended for his type, choose income level intended for the other type (partial
mimicking on income). The second set of constraints ensures an individual of type i , while
choosing the income intended for his type, will not mimick the other on transport trips. The
solution of this problem is provided in the Appendix.
We now provide a sufficient condition under which using separable functions T (I) and
P (D,B) is enough to implement ASB. As long as the condition holds, means-testing is not
required.
PROPOSITION 3: Assume that the government wanted to implement the sec-
ond best allocation ASB using a separate payment schedule for income T (I)
and transportation P (D,B). Then a sufficient condition for ASB to be im-
plementable is that it satisfies D2 + B2 ≥ D1 + B1 and aDD1 + aBB1 ≥
aDD
2 + aBB
2
The condition requires that high ability/income households travel more, but their total
19
travel time is smaller than for the others. This can be the case if high income households
commute more by cars than low income ones, while public transport trips have larger time
costs than trips by car.23
In the numerical examples below, the condition given in Proposition 5 generally holds.
In fact, even when it fails, we find no counterexample in which implementation with sepa-
rable functions is unfeasible. We also go one step further. Instead of using functions T (I)
and P (D,B), we study whether implementation of ASB can be achieved by complementing
the income tax schedule T (I) with two separate tariff schedules, P (D) for cars and Q(B)
for public transportation. The theoretical problem is similar to the one presented above,
but considerably more complex to solve. The volume of conditions to be checked would
make treating the problem in an analytical way simply too tedious. This is why we only
investigate the issue numerically. The results obtained seem to support the conclusion that
implementation is feasible even using fully separable transport tariff functions.
5 Numerical illustration
We present here a numerical example to illustrate the features of the optimal tariff schemes
derived above. We are also interested in verifying that conditions for implementability in
separable functions, as discussed in Section 5, reasonably hold. In order to focus on these
two aspects, we only look at the case of nonlinear tariff schemes and consider fixed network
capacities. The examples are based on the following utility and daily productivity functions
U(C,D,B, x) = C
1
3 + 0.05
(
D
1
2 +B
1
2
)
+ 3x
1
2 f(h) = h
5
6
and we assume that pii = δ
i = 1
2
i = 1, 2. We also use the following function for time of car
trips: aD = a + 0.00015D¯. We are going to describe three scenarios, each characterized by
different relative qualities (measured in terms of trip time costs) of cars and public transport.
They are obtained by varying the intercept a for car trips, as well as the time cost of public
transport trips aB. In Scenario 1, we have a = 0.005 and aB = 0.01, in Scenario 2 a = 0.003
and aB = 0.015. Finally, a = 0.001 and aB = 0.02 in Scenario 3. Recall that individuals'
endowment of time is normalized to one. We fix the monetary cost of a car trip to one and
set cB = 0.1 for a public transport trip. In each scenario, w2 is set at 100 and we vary w1
from 50 to 90. This produces differences in earned income, at the second-best allocation,
23Empirical evidence suggests that travel (and commuting) tend to be increasing in income. This is partic-
ularly true for car travel (Hu and Ruscher (2004), Table 32). A modal split such that high income households
travel more by car than low income households is, thus, not unlikely. Moreover, the UK Department for
Transport reports a value of time for a commuting trip by car, on average, which is about one third of that
of a commuting trip by public transport (DfT (2011), Table 9).
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that go from the low ability type earning about 25% to about 75% of the (pre-tax) income
of the other type. For each scenario, we report individuals' earned income I i, their amount
of travel on each mode and the optimal per-trip tariffs (all computed at the second-best
allocation).
Concerning implementability, we refer to Condition I as implementability of the second-
best allocation using separable transport tariffs and income taxes, making use, possibly,
of a joint payment schedule for cars and public transport. Condition II identifies instead
implementability using fully separable transport tariffs (i.e. separate payment schemes for
cars and public transport), on top of a separate income tax schedule. For each scenario, we
verify whether such conditions hold. Results suggest that implementability can be achieved
in many circumstances, even when using three separate payment schedules for cars, public
transport and income.
Scenario 1. In the first scenario, public transportation is a good alternative to cars. Good
enough, in fact, to have both high and low income individuals make it their main commuting
mode. This scenario may represent cities in which public transportation is very effective
and the primary commuting mode for most of the population. Fitting examples might be
European cities like Zurich and Stockholm. We can see that trip quantities are increasing
with income, as individuals supply more labor and need to commute increasingly often. Note,
in particular, that as her productivity increases, the low ability type works and commutes
more, though always less than the high income type. Due to low road congestion, the
pigouvian tax τD on car trips is quite small (about 5% of the monetary cost of a car trip).
The per-trip tariff t2D is strictly higher than that (though by a small amount), while t
1
D is
smaller. Low ability types pay the smaller per-trip tariff also on public transport. This is
because, at the margin, the cost (in terms of lower daily productivity) of reducing the amount
of commuting is larger than the time cost of a journey, on both modes (see the expression
for the term z in optimal tariffs of Proposition 1). However, the difference between the
marginal tariff intended for high and low types is larger for cars than for public transport.24
This is due to the fact that public transport has higher time costs. Finally, considering
implementability of the second-best allocation, the sufficient condition of Proposition 5 fails.
Nonetheless, implementability is achievable using fully separable payment functions (i.e.
Condition I and II hold), in all cases considered.
24The situation in which w1 = 50 is an exception only because t
1
D is constrained to be nonnegative.
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Scenario 2. Compared to Scenario 1, we consider here a situation in which the car, though
more expensive, is significantly more attractive than public transportation. As a conse-
quence, modal split is such that public transport is popular only among low income individ-
uals, while the others mostly travel by car (except in the case in which w1 = 90 and earning
abilities are very similar). The reason is that low income types work less than the others
in equilibrium (this is optimal given their lower productivity), are less time constrained and
can better cope with a more time-consuming (but cheaper) travel mode. The higher volume
of car trips implies the pigouvian tax τD is at about 4 times higher than in Scenario 1.
Once again, optimal per-trip tariffs are smaller when intended for low than for high ability
types, with the difference being larger for cars than for public transport. Implementability
in separable functions is achievable in all the cases presented. The sufficient condition of
Proposition 5 holds, except in case w1 = 50. In that case, however, it is impossible to imple-
ment the second-best allocation with separate tariff schedules for cars and public transport
(as long as they do not depend on income). Implementation is feasible, instead, if a joint
transport tariff scheme (independent of income) is used.
Scenario 3. In this scenario, public transport travel is significantly more time consuming
than car travel (time cost being more than five times that of a car trip). Cars are thus the
22
preferred mode by both high and low income households, except in the case in which low
income ones earn (and work) much less than the others. This scenario seems consistent with
the situation of many car-dependent cities. Fitting examples may be American ones such as
Atlanta or Los Angeles. Note, however, that low income types commute to a much smaller
extent than their high income counterparts. Optimal tariffs follow similar patterns as in
Scenario 2, except that the pigouvian tax for cars is larger, given stronger road congestion.
As in Scenario 2, the sufficient condition of Proposition 5 holds in all cases presented, except
case w1 = 50. Implementability of the second-best allocation is feasible using separate tariffs
and income taxes. This is true except when w1 = 50. In that case, a joint tariff schedule for
both transport modes (separate from the income tax schedule) is necessary.
6 Concluding remarks
Our findings suggest that transport tariffs can, if properly designed, be used to improve the
redistributive capabilities of the tax system. In a nutshell, this is because low ability types
and high ability mimickers may have, at the same allocation, different values of time and
changes in commuting costs affect their labor supply in different ways. This has led us to
results which are perhaps counterintuitive, such as the fact that low income individuals may
optimally have to pay higher (marginal) tariffs for using a given mode than high income in-
dividuals. Moreover, redistributive concerns may actually provide an additional justification
for congestion pricing.
Our results rest, anyway, on some important assumptions. First, we have assumed that
the income tax is optimally designed, which may not always be the case in reality. Yet, we
have no reason to believe that the results would not stand even if the income tax schedule is
suboptimal, as long as it can be flexibly adjusted to account for changes in transportation
policy (as in, e.g., Kaplow (2006)).
Second, we have assumed that commuters can respond to increased travel costs by rais-
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ing daily work hours and ignored other margins of flexibility, such as changing residence or
shifting travel to off-peak hours (Arnott et al. (1993)). Including the first feature in the
model would require modelling also the urban land market, which is out of our scope. More-
over, fixed residence is often assumed in labor economics models studying commuting costs
(Gutierrez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2010)). As for changes in travel times, while they
would certainly add depth to the model, we can speculate that they would not significantly
affect our results. Indeed, a likely response by commuters to increased peak-hour travel costs
(e.g. the introduction of a road toll) would be to leave home earlier and/or stay longer at
work. Hence, an increase in commuting costs would increase daily and total labor supply
(at given income, at least), as it is already the case in our model.
Finally, we have neglected the presence of multiple government levels (e.g. local and
national ones), which may have different powers as well as divergent objectives. 25
We plan, in future work, to extend our research study to incorporate these features.
25We could consider the presence of an additional part of the population living outside the urban area.
Assuming these people do not use its transport network (so that they do not care for D and B), fixed
residential location, and that tax schedules are flexible enough to be differentiated between people belonging
to a given urban agglomeration and those who do not, our results would not change. They would also not
change with multiple urban areas and, again, income tax schedules may be differentiated across them.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The first order conditions of this problem are
∂L
∂C1
= δ1U1C − pi1µ− λU21C = 0 (7)
∂L
∂C2
= δ2U2C − pi2µ+ λU2C = 0 (8)
∂L
∂D1
=
(
δ1U1D − λU21D
)− pi1µ− λpi1∂ϕD
∂D¯
(
D1φ
21
x −D2φ2x
)− pi1 ∑
i=1,2
δiDi
∂ϕD
∂D
φix = 0 (9)
∂L
∂D2
= U2D
(
δ2 + λ
)− pi2µ− λpi2∂ϕD
∂D¯
(
D1φ
21
x −D2φ2x
)− pi2 ∑
i=1,2
δiDi
∂ϕD
∂D
φix = 0 (10)
∂L
∂B1
= δ1U1B − λU21B − cBpi1µ = 0 (11)
∂L
∂B2
= U2B
(
δ2 + λ
)− cBpi2µ = 0 (12)
∂L
∂I1
= δ1U1I − λU21I + pi1µ = 0 (13)
∂L
∂I2
= U2I
(
δ2 + λ
)
+ pi2µ = 0 (14)
where subscripts denote partial derivatives, U ix ≡ φix is the marginal utility of pure leisure
and U ij ≡ γij − (aj +mi)φix j = D,B denotes the marginal utility individual i = 1, 2 derives
from a commuting trip j = D,B. This is net of the opportunity cost of trip time, as well as
the induced adjustment in labor supply m, at a given income and goods bundle. Take (7),
(9) and (11) and rearrange to get to
U1j
U1C
=
vj +
λU21j
µpi1
+
∂ϕD
∂D¯
∂D¯
∂Q1
j
∑
i=1,2 δ
iDiφ
i
x
µ
− λ
µ
∂ϕD
∂D¯
∂D¯
∂Q1j
(D1φ21x −D2φ2x)
1 +
λU21C
µpi1
j = D,B
where ∂D¯
∂Qij
= 1 if j = D and 0 otherwise, as public transport trips do not contribute to road
congestion. Note that vj = 1 if j = D and vj = cB if j = B. Multiplying both sides by
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1 +
λU21C
µpi1
and rearranging we get
U1j
U1C
= vj+
λU21C
µpi1
(
U21j
U21C
− U
1
j
U1C
)
+
∂ϕD
∂D¯
∂D¯
∂Q1j
∑
i=1,2 δ
iDiφ
i
x
µ
−λ
µ
∂ϕD
∂D¯
∂D¯
∂Q1j
(
D1φ21x −D2φ2x
)
j = D,B
(15)
Similarly, using (8), (10) and (12) we get
U2j
U2C
= vj +
∂ϕD
∂D¯
∂D¯
∂Q2j
∑
i=1,2 δ
iDiφ
i
x
µ
− λ
µ
∂ϕD
∂D¯
∂D¯
∂Q2j
(
D1φ21x −D2φ2x
)
j = D,B
In the optimal allocation, we must have
U iD
U iC
= 1 + tiD and
U iB
U iC
= tiB i = 1, 2
Using these relations, we can obtain the marginal tariff rates tij provided in the Proposition.
We now focus on j = D and derive τD and ηD. Rewrite
∂ϕD
∂D¯
∑
i=1,2 δ
iDiφ
i
x
µ
=
∂ϕD
∂D¯
(
δ1D1U
1
xU
1
C
µU1C
+
δ2D2U
2
xU
2
C
µU2C
±
(
λD2U
2
x
µ
− λD1U
21
x
µ
))
now using (7) we have
∂ϕD
∂D¯
D1U
1
xδ
1U1C
µU1C
=
∂ϕD
∂D¯
D1U
1
xpi1µ
µU1C
+
∂ϕD
∂D¯
D1U
1
xλU
21
C
µU1C
and using (8) we have
∂ϕD
∂D¯
D2U
2
xδ
2U2C
µU2C
=
∂ϕD
∂D¯
D2U
2
xpi2µ
µU2C
−
∂ϕD
∂D¯
D2U
2
xλU
2
C
µU2C
so that we can rewrite
∂ϕD
∂D¯
∑
i=1,2 δ
iDiU
i
x
µ
=
∂ϕD
∂D¯
(∑
i=1,2
piiDi
U ix
U iC
+
λD1U
1
xU
21
C
µU1C
− λD1U
21
x
µ
+
λ
µ
(
D1U
21
x −D2U2x
))
finally, replacing the above expression in (15) for j = D and rearranging we have
U1D
U1C
= 1− λU
21
C
µpi1
(
U1D
U1C
− U
21
D
U21C
)
+
∂ϕD
∂D¯
∑
i=1,2
piiDi
U ix
U iC
+
∂ϕD
∂D¯
λ
µ
U21C D1
(
U1x
U1C
− U
21
x
U21C
)
26
and
U2D
U2C
= 1 +
∂ϕD
∂D¯
∑
i=1,2
piiDi
U ix
U iC
+
∂ϕD
∂D¯
λ
µ
U21C D1
(
U1x
U1C
− U
21
x
U21C
)
where the terms τD and ηD as described in the text can be recognized (note that U
i
x =
φix U
i
C = Ω
i
C). We now focus on zj j = D,B. We can write
λU21C
µpi1
(
U21j
U21C
− U
1
j
U1C
)
=
λ
µpi1Ω1C
((
γ21j − ajφ21x −m21φ21x
)
Ω1C −
(
γ1j − a1jφ1x −m1φ1x
)
Ω21C
)
j = D,B
the right hand side can also be written as
λ
µpi1
(
Ω21C
(
γ21j
Ω21C
− γ
1
j
Ω1C
)
+ aj
(
φ1x
Ω21C
Ω1C
− φ21x
)
+
(
φ1x
Ω21C
Ω1C
m1 − φ21x m21
))
j = D,B
Since U(.) is such that
γ1j
Ω1C
=
γ21j
Ω21C
(by separability), the expression above becomes
λΩ21C
µpi1
(
aj
(
φ1x
Ω1C
− φ
21
x
Ω21C
)
+
(
φ1x
Ω1C
m1 − φ
21
x
Ω21C
m21
))
which is zj j = D,B in the text.
Optimal income tax rates
Using (13) and (7) we obtain
U1I
U1C
= −1 + λ
µpi1
U21C
(
U21I
U21C
− U
1
I
U1C
)
now, using the fact that
U1I = −g′
(
I1
w1 (D1 +B1)
)
· φ
1
x
w1
U21I = −g′
(
I1
w2 (D1 +B1)
)
· φ
21
x
w2
we have
t1I = 1 +
U1I
U1C
=
λ
µpi1
Ω21C
g′
(
I1
w1(D1+B1)
)
· φ1x
w1
Ω1C
−
g′
(
I1
w2(D1+B1)
)
· φ21x
w2
Ω21C
 > 0
while, using (14) and (8), we have t2I = 1 +
U2I
U2C
= 0.
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Proof of Proposition 2
We solve this problem assuming that the government can directly determine the level of
congestion (public bad), denoted D¯. When solving the problem, we have thus an additional
equality constraint given by D¯ =
∑
i=1,2 piiD
i. We denote by β the Lagrange multiplier for
this constraint. Thus, the Lagrangian is
L =W + µ
(∑
i=1,2
pii
(
I i − yi + tDDi + (tB − cB)Bi
)− ∑
j=D,B
cKjKj −R
)
+
+λ
(
V 2 − V 21)+ β(D¯ −∑
i=1,2
piiD
i
)
The first order condition of this problem are
∂L
∂qj
= δ1
∂V 1
∂qj
+
(
δ2 + λ
) ∂V 2
∂qj
− λ∂V
21
∂qj
+ µ
[∑
i=1,2
pii
(
Qij + (qD − 1)
∂Di
∂qj
+ (qB − cB) ∂B
i
∂qj
)]
+
−β
∑
i=1,2
pii
∂Di
∂qj
= 0 j = D,B
∂L
∂yi
= δ1
∂V 1
∂yi
+
(
δ2 + λ
) ∂V 2
∂yi
−λ∂V
21
∂yi
+µpii
[
−1 + (qD − 1) ∂D
i
∂yi
+ (qB − cB) ∂B
i
∂yi
]
−βpii∂D
i
∂yi
= 0 i = 1, 2
∂L
∂I i
= δ1
∂V 1
∂I i
+
(
δ2 + λ
) ∂V 2
∂I i
−λ∂V
21
∂I i
+µpii
[
1 + (qD − 1) ∂D
i
∂I i
+ (qB − cB) ∂B
i
∂I i
]
−βpii∂D
i
∂I i
= 0 i = 1, 2
∂L
∂D¯
=
∂ϕD
∂D¯
(
δ1
∂V 1
∂aD
+
(
δ2 + λ
) ∂V 2
∂aD
− λ∂V
21
∂aD
+ µ
∑
i=1,2
pii
[
(qD − 1) ∂D
i
∂aD
+ (qB − cB) ∂B
i
∂aD
])
+
+β
(
1−
∑
i=1,2
pii
∂Di
∂aD
∂ϕD
∂D¯
)
= 0
note that
∂V i
∂aD
= −φixDi i = 1, 2
∂V 21
∂aD
= −φ21x D21
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To start, we are going to focus on ∂L
∂D¯
. Add λ∂V
21
∂y1
(
∂V 1
∂aD
/∂V
1
∂y1
)
∂ϕD
∂D¯
to both sides and rearrange
to get
∂ϕD
∂D¯
((
δ1
∂V 1
∂y1
− λ∂V
21
∂y1
)(
∂V 1
∂aD
/
∂V 1
∂y1
)
+ λ
∂V 21
∂y1
(
∂V 1
∂aD
/
∂V 1
∂y1
− ∂V
21
∂aD
/
∂V 21
∂y1
))
+
+
∂ϕD
∂D¯
((
δ2 + λ
) ∂V 2
∂y2
(
∂V 2
∂aD
/
∂V 2
∂y2
)
+
(
µ
∑
i=1,2
pii
[
(qD − 1) ∂D
i
∂aD
+ (qB − cB) ∂B
i
∂aD
]))
+
+β
(
1−
∑
i=1,2
pii
∂Di
∂aD
∂ϕD
∂D¯
)
= 0
now substituting δ1 ∂V
1
∂y1
−λ∂V 21
∂y1
and (δ2 + λ) ∂V
2
∂y2
from the first order conditions for ∂L
∂y
above,
we obtain, after some rearrangements
∂ϕD
∂D¯
(
µ
(∑
i=1,2
pii
∂V i
∂aD
/
∂V i
∂yi
)
+ λ
∂V 21
∂y1
(
∂V 1
∂aD
/
∂V 1
∂y1
− ∂V
21
∂aD
/
∂V 21
∂y1
))
+
+
∂ϕD
∂D¯
[
µ
∑
i=1,2
pii (qD − 1)
(
∂Di
∂aD
− ∂D
i
∂yi
(
∂V i
∂aD
/
∂V i
∂yi
))]
+
+
∂ϕD
∂D¯
[
µ
∑
i=1,2
pii (qB − cB)
(
∂Bi
∂aD
− ∂B
i
∂yi
(
∂V i
∂aD
/
∂V i
∂yi
))]
+
+β
∂ϕD
∂D¯
(∑
i=1,2
pii
∂Di
∂yi
(
∂V i
∂aD
/
∂V i
∂yi
))
+ β
(
1−
∑
i=1,2
pii
∂Di
∂aD
∂ϕD
∂D¯
)
= 0
To simplify further, we need to use the following Slutsky-type property obtained by Pirttilä
and Tuomala (1997)
−pii∂D
i
∂yi
(
∂V i
∂aD
/
∂V i
∂yi
)
∂ϕD
∂D¯
= pii
(
∂D˜i
∂aD
− ∂D
i
∂aD
)
∂ϕD
∂D¯
i = 1, 2
where a tilde denotes hicksian demands. Using these properties, the condition above rewrites
as
β = −χ
(
µ
(∑
i=1,2
pii
∂V i
∂aD
/
∂V i
∂yi
)
+ λ
∂V 21
∂y1
(
∂V 1
∂aD
/
∂V 1
∂y1
− ∂V
21
∂aD
/
∂V 21
∂y1
))
∂ϕD
∂D¯
+
−χ
(
µ
∑
i=1,2
pii
[
(qD − 1) ∂D˜
i
∂aD
+ (qB − cB) ∂B˜
i
∂aD
])
∂ϕD
∂D¯
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where χ = 1
1− ∂ϕD
∂D¯
∑
i=1,2 pii
∂Di
∂aD
. Let us now proceed by multiplying ∂L
∂yi
by Di for i = 1, 2
and adding the resulting expressions to ∂L
∂qD
. Then multiply ∂L
∂yi
by Bi for i = 1, 2 and
add the resulting expressions to ∂L
∂qB
. The equations obtained as a result can be simplified
making use of Roy's identity and using the Slutsky equations
∂Qij
∂qj
=
∂Q˜ij
∂qj
− Qij ∂V
i
∂yi
, where
QiD = D
i QiB = B
i and where a tilde denotes hicksian demands. As a results, we obtain
µ
∑
i=1,2
pii
((
qD − β
µ
− 1
)
∂D˜i
∂qj
+ (qB − cB) ∂B˜
i
∂qj
)
= λ
∂V 21
∂y1
(
Q1j −Q21j
)
j = D,B
Finally, one needs to replace for β as obtained above and rearrange to obtain, from the last
two expressions above, the optimal tariffs as expressed in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3
We proceed assuming the following conditions hold at ASB: I
2
ww
> I
1
w1
, I2−T 2 > I1−T 1, I2 >
I1.26
Payments P 1 and P 2 are defined as the payments such that
Ω
(
I2 − T 2 − P 2)+ γ (D2, B2)+ φ(1− aDD2 − aBB2 − (D2 +B2) g( I2
w2 (D2 +B2)
))
=
Ω
(
I2 − T 2 − P 1)+ γ (D1, B1)+ φ(1− aDD1 − aBB1 − (D1 +B1) g( I2
w2 (D1 +B1)
))
(16)
that is, P 2−P 1 is the extra payment that needs to be asked to a type 2 individual in order to
ensure that she (when choosing the level of income I2) will consume trip quantities D2 +B2
rather than D1 +B1.27
Proof of validity of (5) for i = 1 at ASB Rewrite the left hand side of (16) for i=2, using
(2) (we know this constraint to be satisfied at equality since, by assumption, it constraint
26Their meaning is the following: with I
2
ww >
I1
w1 , we assume that the amount of labor supplied by the
high ability type is larger than that of the low ability type. We also assume that both the pre-tax and the
post-tax income of individuals of high ability is higher than that of low ability types.
27Similarly, P 1 should be designed as the payment such that trip quantity D1 +B1 gives the same utility,
to an individual of type 1 choosing to earn income I1, as making no trips at all. However choosing no travel
at all would always be a dominated alternative, given their commuting purpose (with no commuting, labor
supply would be infinite) even if P 1 took away all of the individual's net income. We thus set P 1 arbitrarily.
This also means that we can be sure that neither individuals of type 1 nor those of type 2 will prefer zero
trips to, respectively, D1 +B1 and D2 +B2, as long as P 1 and P 2 are not unreasonably high.
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binds at ASB). We have the following
Ω
(
I1 − T 1 − P 1)+ γ (D1, B1)+ φ(1− aDD1 − aBB1 − (D1 +B1) g( I1
w2 (D1 +B1)
))
=
Ω
(
I2 − T 2 − P 1)+ γ (D1, B1)+ φ(1− aDD1 − aBB1 − (D1 +B1) g( I2
w2 (D1 +B1)
))
therefore
Ω
(
I1 − T 1 − P 1) = Ω (I2 − T 2 − P 1)+ φ(1− aDD1 − aBB1 − (D1 +B1) g( I2
w2 (D1 +B1)
))
+
−φ
(
1− aDD1 − aBB1 −
(
D1 +B1
)
g
(
I1
w2 (D1 +B1)
))
So constraint (5) for i = 1 is verified if (replacing Ω (I1 − T 1 − P 1) from the above and
rearranging)
φ
(
1− aDD1 − aBB1 −
(
D1 +B1
)
g
(
I1
w1 (D1 +B1)
))
+
−φ
(
1− aDD1 − aBB1 −
(
D1 +B1
)
g
(
I2
w1 (D1 +B1)
))
≥
φ
(
1− aDD1 − aBB1 −
(
D1 +B1
)
g
(
I1
w2 (D1 +B1)
))
+
−φ
(
1− aDD1 − aBB1 −
(
D1 +B1
)
g
(
I2
w2 (D1 +B1)
))
This is verified by convexity of g(.) and concavity of φ(.).
Proof of validity of (6) for i = 1 at ASB Start from (6) for i = 2. Using (16), we have
Ω
(
I2 − T 2 − P 1)− Ω (I2 − T 2 − P 2)− γ (D2, B2)+ γ (D1, B1) =
φ
(
1− aDD2 − aBB2 −
(
D2 +B2
)
g
(
I2
w2 (D2 +B2)
))
+
−φ
(
1− aDD1 − aBB1 −
(
D1 +B1
)
g
(
I2
w2 (D1 +B1)
))
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Now assume that D2 +B2 ≥ D1 +B1 and aDD1 +aBB1 ≥ aDD2 +aBB2. Then, by I2w2 > I
1
w1
and concavity of φ(.), we have
φ
(
1− aDD2 − aBB2 −
(
D2 +B2
)
g
(
I2
w2 (D2 +B2)
))
+
−φ
(
1− aDD1 − aBB1 −
(
D1 +B1
)
g
(
I2
w2 (D1 +B1)
))
>
φ
(
1− aDD2 − aBB2 −
(
D2 +B2
)
g
(
I1
w1 (D2 +B2)
))
+
−φ
(
1− aDD1 − aBB1 −
(
D1 +B1
)
g
(
I1
w1 (D1 +B1)
))
therefore
Ω
(
I2 − T 2 − P 1)+ γ (D1, B1)− Ω (I2 − T 2 − P 2)− γ (D2, B2) >
φ
(
1− aDD2 − aBB2 −
(
D2 +B2
)
g
(
I1
w1 (D2 +B2)
))
+
−φ
(
1− aDD1 − aBB1 −
(
D1 +B1
)
g
(
I1
w1 (D1 +B1)
))
Now, by concavity of Ω(.) and since I2 − T 2 > I1 − T 1, we can write
Ω
(
I1 − T 1 − P 1)− Ω (I1 − T 1 − P 2) > Ω (I2 − T 2 − P 1)− Ω (I2 − T 2 − P 2)
therefore
Ω
(
I1 − T 1 − P 1)+ γ (D1, B1)− Ω (I1 − T 1 − P 2)− γ (D2, B2) >
φ
(
1− aDD2 − aBB2 −
(
D2 +B2
)
g
(
I1
w1 (D2 +B2)
))
+
−φ
(
1− aDD1 − aBB1 −
(
D1 +B1
)
g
(
I1
w1 (D1 +B1)
))
which, rearranged, gives us (6) for i = 1.
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Validity of (5) for i =2 at ASB Use (2) to rewrite the left hand side of (5) for i = 2. We
can rearrange to get
Ω
(
I1 − T 1 − P 1)+ γ (D1, B1)− Ω (I1 − T 1 − P 2)− γ (D2, B2) ≥
φ
(
1− aDD2 − aBB2 −
(
D2 +B2
)
g
(
I1
w2 (D2 +B2)
))
+
−φ
(
1− aDD1 − aBB1 −
(
D1 +B1
)
g
(
I1
w2 (D1 +B1)
))
Now, by concavity of Ω(.) and since I2 − T 2 > I1 − T 1, we have
Ω(I1 − T 1 − P 1)− Ω(I1 − T 1 − P 2) > Ω(I2 − T 2 − P 1)− Ω(I2 − T 2 − P 2)
(5) is thus certainly satisfied if
Ω(I2 − T 2 − P 1)− Ω(I2 − T 2 − P 2)− γ(D2, B2) + γ(D1, B1) ≥
φ
(
1− aDD2 − aBB2 −
(
D2 +B2
)
g
(
I1
w2 (D2 +B2)
))
+
−φ
(
1− aDD1 − aBB1 −
(
D1 +B1
)
g
(
I1
w2 (D1 +B1)
))
holds. Using (16) we can replace for the left hand side of the above and rearranging we have
φ
(
1− aDD1 − aBB1 −
(
D1 +B1
)
g
(
I1
w2 (D1 +B1)
))
+
−φ
(
1− aDD1 − aBB1 −
(
D1 +B1
)
g
(
I2
w2 (D1 +B1)
))
≥
φ(1− aDD2 − aBB2 −
(
D2 +B2
)
g
(
I1
w2 (D2 +B2)
)
) +
−φ(1− aDD2 − aBB2 −
(
D2 +B2
)
g
(
I2
w2 (D2 +B2)
)
)
On condition that D2 + B2 ≥ D1 + B1 and aDD1 + aBB1 ≥ aDD2 + aBB2, this is verified.
Therefore, (5) holds as well.
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